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Summary & Conclusions - This paper describes the software 
fault tlderance scheme, t / ( n  - 1)-Variant Programming ( t / (n  - 1)- 
W), which is based on a particular system diagnosis technique used 
in hardware and thereby has some special advantages involving 
a simplified adjudication mechanism and enhanced capability of 
tolerating faults. The dependability of the t / ( n  - 1)-VP architcc- 
ture is evaluated and then compared with two similar schemes: N- 
version programming (NVP) and N self-checking programming 
(NSCP). The comparison shows that t/(n-1)-VP is a viable addi- 
tion or alternative to present techniques. 
Much of the classical dependahility-analysis of software fault 
tolerance approaches has focused on the simplest architectural ex- 
amples that tolerate only single software faults, without consider- 
ing tollerance to multiple andlor related faults. The results obtain- 
ed froim such analyses are thus restricted. The dependability evalua- 
tion in1 this paper deals with more-complicated & general software 
redundancy: various architectures tolerating two or more faults. 
It is no surprise that we come to new conclusions: both t / (n - 1)- 
VP antd the NVP scheme have the ability to tolerate some related 
faults between software variants: in general, t / (n -  1)-W has higher 
reliability, whereas NVP is better from the safety viewpoint. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Acronyms & Abbreviations 
Dep-’F s-dependent fault’ 
Indep-F s-independent fault 
NMR. N-modular redundancy 
NSClP N self-checking programming 
NVP N-version programming 
NVS sequential application of NVP 
KB recovery block(s) 
SFT software fault tolerance 
t /  ( n  - 1)-VP t /  ( n  - 1)-variant programming 
Hardware fault tolerance has been a common practice for 
many years and forms a vital part of any dependable computing 
system. A relatively new development is the fault tolerance 
techniques for coping with unanticipated faults such as design 
(typically software) faults [ 11. In principle, simple replication 
of software components is insufficient because software design 
’Also often referred to as: related fault. 
faults can be reproduced when redundant copies are made [2]. 
SFT usually requires design diversity. For design-diversity , two 
or more variants of a component for redundant computations 
are s-independently designed to meet a common service 
specification. Variants are aimed at delivering the same service, 
but implemented in different ways in the hope that they do not 
contain the same design faults. Since at least two variants are 
involved, tolerance to design faults necessitates an adjudicator 
[3] (a decision algorithm) that determines a single (assumed to 
be) error-free result based on the results produced by multiple 
variants. Several techniques have been proposed for structur- 
ing a software system, and providing SFT: RB [2], NVP [4], 
NSCP [ 5 ] ,  and some intermediate or combined techniques eg, 
[6 ,  71. These techniques are complementary to (not a substitute 
for) those for achieving software fault avoidance such as 
verification & validation, software testing, and proof 
methodology. 
RB was the first scheme developed for achieving SFT [2, 
81; variants are organized in a manner similar to standby-sparing 
[9] used in hardware. RB performs run-time fault detection by 
augmenting any conventional hardware/software error detec- 
tion mechanism with an acceptance test applied to the results 
of execution of one variant. If the test fails, an alternate variant 
is invoked after backward error recovery is performed. Resear- 
chers at UCLA devised NVP [4] which directly applies the hard- 
ware NMR [9] to software. N versions (variants) of a program 
that have been s-independently designed are executed in parallel 
and their results compared by an adjudicator. By incorporating 
a majority vote, the system can eliminate erroneous results (the 
minority) and pass on the presumed-correct results (the majori- 
ty). In simple cases, the voting can be based on tests for iden- 
ticallity ; in general, a more sophisticated & application-oriented 
test is needed. The N variants in NVP can be executed sequen- 
tially. Grnarov, Arlat, Avizienis [lo] sketched such a sequen- 
tial application of NVP, called NVS. Laprie, et al [5 ,  111 
developed NSCP which attains fault tolerance by the parallel 
execution of N self-checking software components. Each self- 
checking component consists of a pair of variants with a com- 
parator; one self-checking component is regarded as the active 
component, and the others are considered hot-standby spares. 
The success of a SFT scheme depends largely upon its ad- 
judicator, and unreliability in the adjudicator dramatically 
reduces the system reliability [l]. The design for a highly 
reliable adjudicator generally requires that: 
the adjudication mechanism and variants being checked are 
as s-independent as possible, so that they cannot be affected 
by common faults or Dep-F; 
the mechanism itself must be simple enough to guarantee its 
reliability and the system performance. 
The traditional mechanisms are not entirely satisfactory. In RB 
software, an acceptance test is used in its adjudication 
mechanism to provide a last line of detecting errors, but since 
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the test is system-specific (and as such, very little specific 
guidance can be given for its construction), it is difficult to en- 
sure that the acceptance test and variants are mutually 
s-independent. To overcome this problem, some schemes adopt 
an adjudication mechanism that selects the results by compar- 
ing the outputs of multiple variants. However, a practical ad- 
judicator used in NVP is much more sophisticated than the early 
simple majority vote, while adjudication mechanisms con- 
structed in NSCP are too simple to detect effectively the Dep- 
F that can occur in the active self-checking components. 
Section 2 develops an alternative, t /  ( n  - 1)-VP, which ex- 
ploits several new research results in system diagnosis [12, 131 
for designing a simplified adjudication mechanism. t /  ( n  - 1)- 
VP has several favorable characteristics, eg, 
the potential ability to tolerate multiple Dep-F among variants, 
simple adjudication mechanism that requires only 0 (n )  result 
delivery of correct service even when the number of faulty 
4 
It cannot be guaranteed that physically-independently 
designed variants will fail s-independently , despite the adop- 
tion of the design diversity [14, 151. The dependability analysis 
of SFT systems must include the effect of Dep-F. Several papers 
devoted to such dependability analysis are [6, 14 - 171. In par- 
ticular, Arlat, Kanoun, Laprie [ 161 developed complete fault 
classifications and presented a detailed evaluation of NVP & 
RB. Their analysis concentrated on basic architectures able to 
tolerate a single fault and thereby the analytic conclusions hold 
only for those specific instances, 
comparison steps, 
variants exceeds the bound t in some fault situations, 
possible forms of graceful degradation. 
Section 3 augments published work by: 
analyzing more complex (more general) architectures that 
carefully identifying the ability of various approaches to 
tolerate two or more software faults; 
tolerate Indep-F & Dep-F. 4 
These results provide designers with: 
richer information about the SFT properties of various ar- 
chitectures than the results from traditional analysis; 
evidence that the t /  ( n  - 1)-VP approach is a viable addition 
or alternative to present schemes for coping with software 
faults. 4 
Notation 
state: adjudicator’s execution 
state: [benign, catastrophic] failure caused by an 
undetected error 
result comparator 
Pr (catastrophic failure of approach X} 
state: [detected, undetected] failure 
state: software execution 
Pr{failure of approach X} 
state: software is idle during the specified exposure 
period 
N, n 
P 
ql, qA 
qA,D, qA,u Pr{a [detected, undetected] Indep-F in the 
qA,v 
qm,v Pr(Dep-F among m variants} 
qu Pr{an undetected failure} 
qc 
r, result of V,  
Rx( t ) ,  Sx( t) 
V state: variant execution 
V,  software variant i 
U departure rate from state I 
qi+ 1 (comparison) test outcome 
4( .) indicator function: S(True) = 1, S(Fa1se) =O. 
Other, standard notation is given in “Information for Readers 
& Authors” at the rear of each issue. Less frequently used nota- 
tion is defined in the text where it appears. 
number of software variants 
Pr { all variants produce the same correct results} 
Pr{an Indep-F in [a variant, the adjudicator]} 
adjudicator} 
Pr{Dep-F among the variants and the adjudicator} 
Pr{a catastrophic failure due to an undetected error} 
[reliability, safety] of approach X 
2. t/(n-1)-VP 
In the theory of system-level fault diagnosis’, the t /  ( n  - 1)- 
diagnosability measure was introduced in [ 181. Its diagnosis goal 
is, for a system of n units, to isolate the faulty units to a set of 
size at most (n - l), under the condition that the number of faulty 
units is at most t .  That is: at least 1 unit exists such that it is not 
in the set of size (n - 1) and can thus be unambiguously identified 
as fault-free, provided that the system itself is t /  (n - 1)-fault 
diagnosable and the number of faulty units in the system does not 
exceed the bound t. Thus the t /  ( n - 1)-diagnosis technique can 
be used to select a single correct result from the results generated 
by n replicated software modules (of s-independent design). We 
might benefit from the use oft/ ( n  - 1)-diagnosis since this special 
diagnosis measure appreciably reduces the requirement on the 
number of tests (number of result comparisons) relative to previous 
diagnosis schemes. It is thus possible to use the idea behind the 
t /  ( n - 1)-diagnosis technique to construct a simple, dependable 
adjudication mechanism. Based on current theoretical results of 
t /  ( n  - 1)-diagnosis (see [ 19 - 241 and a subsequent discussion), 
we develop a new scheme for tolerating hardware andlor soft- 
ware faults. This scheme is described first in terms of application 
to SFT, but the approach can be implemented with hardware [22]. 
Two classes of software faults are distinguished: Indep-F & Dep-F 
[ 11, 161. Indep-F occur in single variants or in the adjudication 
mechanism, while Dep-F can take place among multiple variants 
and among the adjudicator and one or more variants. 
2.1 Description of t/ ( n  - 1)-VP and an Example 
A general t /  ( n  - 1)-VP architecture can identify the cor- 
rect result from a subset of the results of n software modules 
’See [12, 131 where more references are given. 
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(or variants), provided that the number of faulty modules in the 
architecture does not exceed t (ie, it can tolerate at least t soft- 
ware faults). The 4 steps of t /  ( n  - 1)-VP are: 
:I. Each of n s-independently designed software variants 
is executed in parallel. 
2. Some, but not all, of their results are compared to pro- 
duce a syndrome. 
3. Using the syndrome, a diagnosis program performs 
t /  ( n  -- 1)-diagnosis and selects a presumably correct result as 
the system output (eg, through switching of the results). 
4. If no acceptable result is identified in step 3, the system 
invok.es spare software variants, if they exist, or simply signals 
an exception. I 
2.1.1 Example 
‘This example demonstrates the ability of t l  ( n  - 1)-VP to 
tolerate both Indep-F & Dep-F. 
[n = 5 and t = 21 
Figure 1. A t l  ( n  - 1)-VP Architecture 
Figure 1 shows a t/ ( n  - 1)-VP architecture for n = 5 and t =2. 
This 2/(5 - 1)-VP architecture consists of 5 s-independently 
designed software modules, Vl, . .. , V,, which are executed in 
parallel in a framework that is intended to cater for up to 2 
simuiltaneous software faults. Three comparators C1, C, C3 
are placed at the outputs of V I ,  V,, V,, V4 to perform error 
detection; where C, compares the results of V,  & V,  + ( i  = 1, 
2, 3) and generates the test outcome w , , , + ~ .  The 3 q 2 ,  02,3, 
w3.4 constitute a syndrome. In particular, 
wiJ = 4(results of V,  & VJ disagree). 
The t/ ( n  - 1)-diagnostor program selects one of the VI, V,, V5 
according to the value of the syndrome, and switches service 
delivery (system output) to the selected result. The adjudicator 
of the architecture is implemented by the: 
3 comparators, 
t /  ( n  - 1)-diagnostor, 
* output switch. 
V, & V3 are not connected to the output switch, and V5 is not 
connected to a comparator. However, this architecture is 
t /  ( n  - 1)-diagnosable for t =2: the diagnostor can always select 
a correct result if, 
‘number of Indep-F & Dep-F in variants’ I 2. 
Table 1 gives all possible syndromes and the corresponding 
results that can be unambiguously diagnosed as correct, for t=2. 
For example, for, 
a single correct result cannot be simply identified from among 
those produced by VI, V . ,  V,, V4. We can however infer from 
the syndrome that two or more of VI, V2, V3, V4 have 
generated incorrect results because one single fault cannot lead 
to such a syndrome. Hence the result of V5 must be correct. 
For, 
either all of Vl, V,, V3, V, are correct or all of them are in- 
correct. By the previous assumption that t = 2, these results 
should be classified as acceptable. Following a similar method, 
we can analyze other cases to determine the correct results. 
Table 1 can be viewed as a simple diagnosis algorithm for this 
example. Table 1 shows the important fact: at least one of rl, 
r4, r5 must be correct for a given syndrome. Accordingly, this 
architecture can deliver the correct system output by choosing 
just among the results of VI, V4, V5. 
Table 1. Possible Syndromes and Result  Selections 
[for this example 2/(5 - 1)-VP architecture] 
w1,2 w2,3 w3.4 Presumably Correct Results 
2.1.2 t /  ( n  - 1)-VP architecture for given n, t 
Unlike the NVP scheme and its variations, t/(n-1)-VP 
does not have to make pair-wise comparisons among the results 
of n variants in order to identify a presumably correct result. 
We do calculate how many result comparisons (corresponding 
to the comparators illustrated in figure 1) are usually required 
for a general t /  ( n  - 1)-architecture. 
In the simplest case, n=3 and t = l ,  one comparator is 
necessary & sufficient for t/ ( n  - 1)-diagnosis - the third result 
must be acceptable when the two compared results disagree; 
otherwise they can be identified as correct. 
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Larger n & t require a more deliberate comparison assign- 
ment among the results of multiple variants so as to guarantee 
t /  ( n  - 1)-diagnosability. For example, result comparisons of n 
variants can be organized into a form of chains, where Ci (1 
5 i 5 n-  1) compares the results of V,  & V,,,. Alternative- 
ly, result comparisons can be organized into a more complex 
structure, H2r,n, where the result of (1 I i 5 n )  is com- 
pared with that of VJ iff 
i - r  I j I i + r (mod n + l ) ,  r = 1, 2, 3 ,  ... . 
Ref [22: theorem 41 gives several sufficient conditions on the 
result comparison assignments of systems that are t /  ( n  - 1)- 
diagnosable; the result is reproduced here. 
Theorem 1. A system S composed of n units (or software 
variants) is t /  ( n  - 1)-diagnosable if n 2 2t + 1 and the assign- 
ment of result comparisons in S contains at least: 
1 I t I 2: a chain of 2t units; 
3 5 t 5 4: a chain of 2t + 1 units; 
5 I t 5 6: an H2r,n structure with r = 1; 
7 I t: an H2r,n structure with r 2 ( t -  1) /5. 
Because the major aim of this paper is to show how the t /  ( n  - 1)- 
diagnosis technique could be applied to the design of SFT 
schemes, this particular technique is not discussed further; see 
[20,22 - 241 for more technical details. The diagnosis algorithms 
with respect to the testing assignments in theorem 1 have been 
developed in [23] for chains and in [24] for H2,,,-type systems. 
For practical values of n (eg ,  3 5 n 5 lo), a t/(n-1)-VP 
architecture uses only O ( n )  comparators and contains a sim- 
ple diagnosis algorithm with linear complexity. The adjudicator 
in such an architecture is simpler than a voter used in NVP 
(which has to be based on O ( n 2 )  result comparison steps). 
For any SFT scheme, the correctness of results output by 
the system cannot always be guaranteed (eg, when more than 
t faults have occurred), and moreover such fault situations can- 
not be detected completely. However, this is not a severe defi- 
ciency; in practice, there are acceptable probabilities of 
catastrophic events, eg, an aircraft computer system usually ac- 
cepts a failure-probability < 10-8/hour in a 10-hour flight 
[25]. Dependability studies on practical fault-tolerant systems 
can be used to determine the Pr{occurrence of t faults). This 
helps to make an appropriate design decision as to which scheme 
is likely to be most effective and how many variants arc suffi- 
cient for a particular application. Additional fault-detection & 
exception-handling techniques [26] can be used to improve fault- 
coverage & fault-tolerance. In the 2/(5 - 1)-architecture of figure 
1, for example, exception-handlers can be incorporated into the 
variants. The function of the handlers in a variant is to handle 
any errors that are detected during the execution of the variant, 
and signaling an exception to the diagnostor. The diagnostor 
comes to final decision according to the value of the syndrome 
and the exception signals received so far: either it delivers a 
presumably correct result, or signals a failure exception. 
2.2 Comparison with Other Schemes 
The t /  ( n  - 1)-VP resembles other SFT techniques, 
especially those requiring the use of result comparisons such 
as NVP & NSCP. The fact that the variants are executed in 
parallel necessitates an input-consistency mechanism and a syn- 
chronization regime, based essentially on wait & send 
primitives, and incorporating a time-out mechanism. However, 
in each case there are important & fundamental distinctions. 
Correct results in t /  ( n  - 1)-VP are not obtained by majority vote 
(as in NVP), or by detecting & discarding erroneous results (as 
in NSCP), but by t /  ( n  - 1)-diagnosis. 
2.2.1 NVP 
It could be argued that t /  ( n  - 1)-VP is only a variation of 
NVP; however, we believe that the majority voting check is 
an integral part of NVP, and each of N software versions in 
NVP is of equal importance. In marked contrast, the t /  ( n  - 1)- 
VP scheme does not try to find a majority of n results, but just 
to identify a presumably correct result. It can therefore deliver 
correct results with some probability even when the majority 
of results of n variants are incorrect. Moreover, t /  ( n  - 1)-VP 
has more flexible architecture. In the architecture of figure 1, 
the VI can be considered as being active, actually delivering 
the system output in the absence of faults; the V, & V, are used 
as “hot” spares, and V, & V, are only exploited for detecting 
errors and producing test outcomes. In addition, NVP requires 
that all variants should be designed to produce the results that 
are essentially identical. This constraint can be loosened in the 
t /  ( n  - 1)-VP approach. While the primary variant VI in the 
1/(5 - 1)-VP architecture should attempt to produce the desired 
output, the spare variant V, might only attempt to provide a 
degraded service. In this form, the t /  (n -  1)-VP architecture 
can be used to implement a type of graceful degradation. 
2.2.2 NVS 
In principle, t /  (n -  l)-VP is also different from NVS (a 
form of sequential NVP) [lo]. The t /  (n -  1)-VP method is based 
on hot-standby redundancy, whereas NVS uses cold-standby . 
More precisely, where the results of Vl & V, disagree (assum- 
ing N = n = 3), t/(n-1)-VP selects the result of V,, which 
has been available, as the system output through the result 
switch. NVS however has to execute first the V, on the same 
set of input values and then makes a further decision by sear- 
ching for a majority of the results. This validation process re- 
quires the extra execution time for V, and for the final deci- 
sion. Clearly, in comparison with tl(n-1)-VP, NVS has 
relatively poor predictability of task completion time and can 
be inappropriate for certain time-critical applications. 
2.2.3 NSCP 
It could be argued that t /  ( n  - l)-VP is somewhat similar 
to NSCP. However, a fundamental distinction between the two 
schemes concerns their capacity for tolerating Dep-F. NSCP 
fails (and even causes catastrophic consequences) whenever the 
two variants that form the active self-checking component 
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produce identical, but incorrect results (no matter how many 
spares are still available). In contrast, t l  (n-  1)-VP can tolerate 
up to t Indep-F or Dep-F; that is, it can deliver the correct ser- 
vice even if t faulty variants compute identical incorrect results. 
2.2.4 RB 
Section 2.1 shows that t/ (n-1)-VP is quite distinct from 
the RI3 concept [2]. Like NVP and its variations, t /  (n - l)-VP 
is complementary in many respects to RB. RB can be more ap- 
propriate for those systems where hardware resources are 
limiteld and comparison-based adjudicators are inappropriate; 
see [l]  for a very detailed discussion of the relative advantages 
& disadvantages of NVP & RB. For simplicity & brevity, we 
focus on the comparison of t/ (n - 1)-VP with NVP & NSCP, 
without further discussing RB. 
3. DEPENDABILITY OF SFT APPROACHES 
This section evaluates the dependability of t/ ( n  - 1)-VP 
and other similar approaches. Arlat, Kanoun, Laprie [ 161 
analyzed some special architectures using RB, NVP, NSCP - 
mainly providing software redundancy able to tolerate single 
software faults. We 
use their modeling framework for investigating the software 
establish a slightly different model to show the different im- 
Three architectures are analyzed that can tolerate at least two 
software faults: 
t /  (n-  1)-VP using 5 variants, adopting a simple diagnosis 
algorithm for result selection (see table 1). 
NVP using 5 variants, adopting the usual majority 
adjudication. 
* NSCP using 6 variants organized as 3 self-checking com- 
ponents; the NSCP considered here can tolerate 2 faults in 
most fault situations except the Dep-F that occur in an active 
se1 f-checking component. 
redundancy needed to tolerate two or more faults, 
pacts of Indep-F & Dep-F on software dependability. 
Expressions for FX & CX, 
X E {tl(n-1)-VP, NVP, NSCP), 
are derived using a Markov approach. 
3.1 Assumptions 
1. During the execution of scheme X, Dep-F manifest 
them:selves in the form of similar errors, whereas Indep-F cause 
only distinct errors. Similar errors lead to common-mode 
failures, and distinct errors cause only s-independent failures. 
2. All variants have the same probability of fault manifesta- 
tion {(or error). 
3. Only a single fault type, either Indep-F or Dep-F, may 
appear during the execution of the scheme and no compensa- 
tion 1[28] may occur between errors o f  the variants and of the 
adjudicator, ie, either an error is detected or it causes an incor- 
rect output. 
4. Probabilities of Ihdep-F & Dep-F are importantly low 
such that p = 1 (as assumed by others in similar settings, eg ,  
1161). 4 
These assumptions are used only to simplify the notation 
and the complexity in modeling and do not alter the importance 
of analytic conclusions. In particular, assumption #2 can be easi- 
ly generalized to the case where the variants have respective 
fault characteristics. More complex models can be developed 
without applying assumption #4, ie, probabilities of Indep-F & 
Dep-F are allowed to be arbitrary; these models are described 
in [17, 271. 
3.2 Detailed Reliability & Safety Models 
Notation 
t specified exposure time. 
Two different but complementary attributes of dependabili- 
ty are considered: 
continuity of service (reliability), 
non-occurrence of catastrophic failure (safety) [28]. 
In general, 
software-re liability is a measure of time-to-failure, 
software-safety is a measure of the time to catastrophic failure 
[16, 281. 
The time (or the specified exposure period) in this definition 
is a relative concept and can mean a single run, several runs, 
or time expressed in calendar or execution time units, of soft- 
ware. For multiple runs, software can be idle between its ex- 
ecutions. However software faults can manifest themselves only 
when software is executed. We therefore focus on the execu- 
tion process of software. Figure 2 shows a slight variation of 
the software behavior model [16]. In this behavior model, a 
detected failure (no service is delivered) is classified as benign; 
an undetected failure (an incorrect result is delivered) can be 
either benign or catastrophic. Since several runs are possible, 
service delivery can be restored from benign failures. Transi- 
tions from D or B to I ,  and from U to B or C, are applied only 
to the safety evaluation. Based on a Markov approach to 
modeling, 
for a detailed discussion see [16]; 
Sx(t) = expfc(a.Cx-t). 
3.3 t/ ( n  - 1)-VP Model for 2/(5 - 1)-Architecture 
Figure 3 is a state-transition diagram for the 2/(5 - 1)- 
architecture. From state E,  the 6 execution states of the ad- 
judicator are listed here. 
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Forlure 
Figure 2. A Modified Behavior Model 
Figure 3. t l ( n  - 1)-VP Model 
AI. 5 variants produce the same correct results. Accor- 
ding to assumption #4, 
p = 1 - 5q1 - 109; - 104; - 5q; - q; - - 
Given no fault in any variant, different types of adjudicator 
failure lead to states D & U with probabilities q A , ~  and qA,u. 
A2 - A3: Activation of 1 or 2 Indep-F in variants, given 
no Dep-F among the variants. These fault types can be tolerated 
by this 2/(5 - 1)-architecture. 
A4 - A6: At least 3 Indep-F manifest themselves in 
variants. Since the number of faults has exceeded the bound 
2, these states can lead to a failure state. However, a more 
precise analysis shows that t /  ( n  - 1)-VP can still deliver a cor- 
rect result in some situations. 
A7: Activation of Dep-F in any two variants. These faults 
can be tolerated. 
A8 - A10: Dep-F manifest themselves in more than 2 
variants, which are undetectable. 
A1 1: Activation of Dep-F between the adjudicator and the 
variants. This is also regarded as undetectable (see assumption 
In this 2/(5 - 1)-VP model, there is the transition from state 
A4 (or A5) to state I :  the architecture can still select a correct 
result as the system output even in the presence of more than 
two faults. Without loss of generality, take state A4 as an ex- 
ample. If 3 Indep-F affect only 3 of variants V, ,  V2, V,, V4, 
then by assumption #1 their results generate the syndrome where 
o,,~ = ~ 2 , 3  = w3,4 = 1. The result of V, (a correct result) is 
then chosen as the system output. This class of events occurs 
with probability 4413. Similarly, if 3 Indep-F affect only Vl, V2, 
V5 (or only V,, V,, V5)  ,according to table 1, the selected result 
can be correct, with probability 2413. In summary, the condi- 
tional probability of the transition from A4 to I is: 
(4413 + 29,3)/10q,’ = 0.6. 
Therefore, the transition from A4 to a failure state can occur 
with the conditional probability: 
4q;/lOq? = 0.4. 
From figure 3, it follows that: 
Ft / (n- l ) -VP = P’ ( q A , D  + qA,u) + 
1oq3,v + 5q4,v + q5.v + q A . v  
+ 4 d  + d + 
A close but pessimistic approximation is: 
Ft / (n- l ) -VP = q A , D  + qA,u + 4s; + 49; + 41” + 
1oq3,v + 5q4,v + q5,v + %,v (1) 
For evaluation of safety, only state C is absorbing: 
G / ( n - l ) - V P  = qc*[qA,u + 44; + + d + 10q3.v + 
5q4,v + q5,v + qA,vl. (2) 
3.4 NVP Model for 5VP-Architecture 
n 
#3). 4 Figure 4. NVP Model 
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Figure 4 shows the NVP model for 5VP-architecture. The 
detailed analysis is similar to that for t/(n-1)-VP. A major 
difference is the case where multiple Indep-F have an impact 
on 3 or more variants, In NVP, this case is much simpler - 
these faults always lead to state D, assuming they are always 
detectable (but not tolerated), Thus, for reliability, 
Due to the detectability of multiple Indep-F: 
3.5 NSCP Model for 3SCP-Architecture 
nent but do not affect the first spare component, the 3SCP ar- 
chitecture can select a correct result and provide usual service. 
The conditional probability of this sub-case is: 
(6/20) *2oq3,,/20q3,v = 0.3. 
2. If Dep-F affect exactly 1 variant in every self-checking 
component, they can be detected effectively; the corresponding 
conditional probability is: 
(23/20) .20q,,~/20q~,, = 0.4. 
3. The worst sub-case is that Dep-F influence: 
the pair of variants in the active component, or 
the pair of variants in the first spare component, given these 
Dep-F have affected a variant in the active one. 
In this sub-case, the 3SCP architecture produces incorrect out- 
puts; the corresponding conditional probability is: 
(6/20)*20q3,v/20q3,v = 0.3. 
A similar analysis can be applied to other states. 
Therefore, from the state-transition diagram: 
4 
q 2 , V  + 14q3,V + I4q4,V + 6q5,V + q6,V + qA,V (5) 
Since Indep-F can be either tolerated or detected, safety of the 
NSCP architecture concerns only Dep-F: 
Figure 5. NSCP Model 
Figure 5 shows the NSCP model for the 3SCP-architecture. 
The interpretations of the states are similar to those of the 
t/ (n -  1)-VP model, though there are 13 states A1 - A13 to con- 
sider because there are 6 variants. Indep-F in 1 or 2 of variants 
can lbe tolerated. Indep-F in 3 or more variants can be either 
tolerated or detected, as indicated by states A4 & A5. Thus 
NSCP is quite effective for treating Indep-F. 
However, cases where Dep-F manifest themselves among 
multiple variants become more complicated. On the one hand, 
NSCP is not fault-tolerant in the worst case - any Dep-F in 
active self-checking components could lead to certain failure 
states. On the other hand, some Dep-F can be tolerated or 
detelcted if they do not affect the pair of variants in an active 
self-checking component. Conlsider a representative case, state 
A9, in which Dep-F manifest themselves in 3 of the 6 software 
variants. The 3 sub-cases are: 
1. If Dep-F occur only In the spare self-checking com- 
ponents or such faults affect just a variant in the active compo- 
3.6 Remarks 
Table 2 summarizes the specific expressions for qz & qu 
and shows that s-independent failures of the variants have a 
relatively small influence upon t/(n - 1)-VP, but a larger im- 
pact on NVP and even more on NSCP. This is because the 
tl(n - 1)-VP possesses an important characteristics of the 
t /(n- 1)-diagnosis technique: it is still possible in some fault 
situations for tl(n - l)-VP to identify the correct results, even 
though faulty variants are in the majority. 
As assumed at the beginning of section 3, the adjudicators 
used in the 3 specific architectures are: 
t/(n - 1)-VP: result comparison plus a diagnosis algorithm, 
NVP: a voter, 
NSCP: result comparison (plus the result switch). 
According to their complexities, it is reasonable to rank qA & 
q A , V  as: 
qA:NSCP qA:t/(n-l)-VP qA:NVP> (7) 
~A,V:NSCP %,V:t/(e-i)-vp 5 ~ A , Y . N V P .  (8) 
It follows from table 2 that Dep-F among variants have the same 
influence upon t/(n - 1)-VP & NVP, but more serious on NSCP. 
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Table 2. Expressions for g, & g, 
~ 
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t/(n - I)-VP NVP NSCP 
This is because result-comparison used in the self-checking com- 
ponents and the NSCP architecture itself are not effective enough 
to detect (or further tolerate) the Dep-F that can affect both 
variants in a self-checking component. Generally, this cannot 
be overcome by incorporating more variants into a given ar- 
chitecture. In contrast, both t /(n - 1)-VP and NVP can tolerate 
some Dep-F under the same bound; and their fault-tolerance 
capability can be enhanced, at least in principle, by involving 
more software variants. 
3.6 General Conclusions 
For reliability: 
Ft/(n-I)-VP < FNVP < FNSCP. (9) 
Inequality (9) means that t /(n - 1)-VP has the lowest 
failure-probability (highest reliability). Due to high detectability 
of Indep-F, NVP is less sensitive to undetected faults than is 
tl(n- 1)-VP. The qu:tl(n-I).VP looks relatively high since this 
scheme can fail to detect some Indep-F when the bound on the 
number of faulty variants is violated. This probability can be 
reduced by using more software variants. The qu.SCp is high 
as well, but again the incorporation of more variants is of no 
effect on safety enhancement of NSCP. So for safety: 
The evaluation data obtained here are used only to uncover 
the relative advantages & disadvantages of these 3 schemes. For 
a given design using a particular scheme, the evaluation results 
also show how the design can be modified to improve further 
its dependability. Since the notion of software dependability cap- 
tures many different concerns, including reliability & safety, 
our analysis demonstrates the need of a delicate balance between 
these complementary attributes. In practice, a software designer 
must make an objective decision as to which technique is likely 
to be most appropriate for a specific application. 
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Changes to: Sensitivity of Reliability-Growth Models to 
Operational Profile Errors vs Testing Accuracy 
1. [l: page 537, col 2, line 231 to 
change 
the reliability-growth estimated by GE for 5 cases: ... 
to 
the reliability-growth estimated by GE for 4 cases: ... 
delete the whole line: 
d. 0P4 with D(OPe, OP,) = 0.85 (solid lower line) 
change. 
sensitivity to errors in the OP. Data concerning the coverage 
sensitivity to errors in the OP. Data concerning the other 
coverage 
2. [l: page 538, col 1, line 21 
3. [1: page 538, col 2, line 231 
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